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The Economist,
The White House
Global Illicit Drug Trends,
For data on anti-drug policy expenditure see September 2, 2000 and
2002. For estimates of production and trade volume see United Nations
Oﬃce for Drug Control and Crime Prevention, various issues.
Abt Associates, 2001 provide price estimates suggesting that, for instance, the retail price
of cocaine in the US fell from $420 per pure gram to $180 per pure gram between 1981
and 1999.
Annual revenues were estimated at $400bn. See United Nations Oﬃce for Drug Control
and Crime Prevention (1998).
See Schneider and Enste (2000).
Trade in illegal goods poses a number of puzzles to economic analysis.
First, State policies to reduce illegal trade often seem to fail or even to
perversely increase it. Current expenditure for anti-drugs policies is about
$40bn in the US alone and yet in the last two decades drug availability has
remained unchanged and prices have been falling steadily. Can attacks on
illegal trade actually be perverse under some circumstances? The problem
is highly signi cant since the trade in illegal drugs accounts for about 8% of
total world trade value, more than, for instance, motor vehicles or textiles.
Second, why do capable States tolerate illegal trade which apparently
reduces tax revenue? The US and most other OECD countries are hostile
to illegal trade, but some rich and many more poor States tolerate it. Many
States are ambivalent in their cooperation with the US war on drugs, while
local governments even in developed countries diﬀer widely in their toler-
ance of drugs, prostitution and unlicensed gambling. The informal sector
as a whole, which includes the production of all goods and services hidden
from tax authorities, accounts for at least 30% of GDP in most developing
countries and for an average 15% of GDP in OECD economies. The
British government famously tolerated massive smuggling in the American
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See Dixit (2001) for an analysis of the case in which the contracting parties (buyers
and sellers in this context) can cheat on one another.
Third, why does predation eliminate trade in some situations, while
impeding but not eliminating other trade? Intuition suggests that in the
absence of  xed costs there should always be some trade along with some
predation. Yet home delivery of pizza, a lawful trade, is unavailable in
some American urban neighborhoods (Raspberry, 2002) while the recent
 lm depicts illegal trade thriving despite predation. Can a simple
economic model of predator/prey relations explain both outcomes?
Our paper provides an explanation of the puzzles in a formal economic
model of trade, predation and enforcement. Predation is understood here as
both theft and extortion. Enforcementis oﬀered by private (possibly illegal)
and governmental  rms. The illegal drugs market provides motivation,
but the model applies very widely to trade subject to predation, and to
the interaction of State and private enforcement in this setting. Trade
subject to predation is rich with externalities which can: (1) cause perverse
responses of the volume of illegal trade to State policies; (2) explain why
non-corrupt States might rationally tolerate informal trade, or even actively
collude with a private monopoly enforcer; and (3) explain the vigor of
markets under predation in some cases and their collapse in other cases.
Traders in our model purchase a good from a low price location and
ship it at increasing cost to the consumers high price location. Shipments
are preyed on by predators drawn from the same labor pool as the traders,
hence at increasing opportunity cost. Resistance to predation via  self-
enforcement  arises as traders attempt to elude predators in anonymous3
5
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Scholars and practitioners do agree that ma as and similar groups act as  govern-
ments  in the underworld enforcing agreements and punishing violators. Ma a members
can of course be directly involved in trade as well. See, for instance Anderson (1995),
Falcone (1991), Firestone (1997) and Gambetta (1994).
hide and seekinteraction. Additionally, a specialized monopoly enforcer
may charge a fee in return for frustrating a portion of encounters between
predator and prey. The trade in illegal drugs, for instance, is protected
and regulated by various organized crime groups such as the Ma a and the
Colombian Cartels which have the monopoly over enforcement in a given
area.
Equilibrium trade can be either insecure or secure in the model. More-
over, trade may be eliminated by potential predation despite gains net of
trade costs. In contrast, casual intuition about the predator/prey relation-
ship suggests that at least a little bit of trade and predation would always
emerge.
A key property of the model is safety in numbers: the equilibrium proba-
bility of successful trade is rising in the volume of trade despite the increase
in the return to predation induced by the rise in prey. We argue that safety
in numbers is quite a general feature of predator/prey models of anonymous
interaction and increasing opportunity cost. Safety in numbers is a source
of scale economies independent of  xed cost, and of complementarity be-
tween markets, both properties being consequential for other properties of
equilibrium.
We show that, in this framework, State raids on illegal trade or attacks
on the monopolistic enforcer need not succeed in reducing illegal trade and
might perversely increase it. Raids will fail if the oﬃcial raiders simply6
6
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That removing the enforcement monopoly could increase the production and trade of
illegal goods has been argued informally by Buchanan (1988 [1973]) and Schelling (1988
[1967]). Other than that, most economic analysis on drug policy has focussed on the
welfare eﬀect of liberalization (see, e.g. Niskanen 1992) rather than on alternative trade
reducing policies.
crowd out private predators who exit into trading. Eliminating the mo-
nopolistic enforcer has ambiguous eﬀects on trade volume since the volume
of trade under self enforcement might actually be higher. The comparison
depends on the balance of three forces. On the one hand, the exercise of
monopoly power shrinks the volume of trade compared to self-enforcement.
On the other hand, the monopoly internalizes the safety in numbers exter-
nality and might have a superior enforcement technology, both increasing
trade. Attacks on the monopolistic enforcer will actually increase trade
when the former eﬀect prevails. Finally, we show that State attacks on
the gross margin upstream and/or downstream   policies such as crop
eradication and negative advertising   are always eﬀective.
Tolerance of illegal trade is rational for a revenue-maximizing State en-
forcer in the formal market when demand is complementary with volume
in the illegal market. Safety in numbers spills over between markets, im-
plying that an exogenous increase in the volume of either legal or illegal
trade makes all shipments more secure. Intuitively, as illegal (legal) trade
increases more agents are devoted to trade and less to predation which
makes legal (illegal) trade more secure also. In contrast, increasing trade
costs linkthe two mark ets with a negative pecuniary externality. Com-
plementarity in demand arises as safety in numbers dominates increasing
trade costs: a rise in illegal trade then increases the willingness to pay for5 T      , C        R      
another unit of State enforced trade. Demand complementarity is associ-
ated with strategic complementarity: a rise in illegal trade will increase
the State s best response level of trade. With complementarities, policies
which reduce illegal trade also tend to reduce legal trade and State revenues.
Complementarities thus imply that the State might rationally tolerate il-
legal trade. Moreover, a non-corrupt State (i.e., one not operated in the
interest of the private enforcer) rationally should collude with the private
enforcer to increase trade and revenues in both markets.
Complementarities obtain in our model when the State s enforcement
technology is weak. With strong enforcement, in contrast, safety in num-
bers is less important because the shipment success rate depends mostly on
enforcement. Economic development is naturally associated with improve-
ments in the enforcement technology, implying that development at some
stage induces a shift in the correlation between the growth of formal and
informal trade from positive to negative. Moreover, highly developed, high
capability States have less incentive to tolerate Ma as, informal sectors and
the trade in illegal goods.
Our analysis of the interaction between legal and illegal trade paral-
lels the works of Grossman (1995) and Marcouiller and Young (1995), who
model the interaction between legal and illegal/informal production. Gross-
man (1995) considers the case of two agencies, the Ma a and the State,
selling enforcement services which are essential for illegal and legal produc-
tion, respectively. As in our case, markets are linked because producers
can operate in either. In his case, however, enforcement services are always7
7
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The paper also contributes to the larger literature that looks at private, pro t-
maximizing enforcement institutions. Grossman and Noh (1994), Grossman (2002),
Moselle and Polak(2001) and Olson (1993) analyze enforcement of property rights. An-
derson and Young (2001) and Dixit (2001) study the enforcement of contracts.
substitutes since the price of both goods are exogenously  xed and do not
depend on the resources dedicated to either type of production. In our
model, in contrast, the price received by the traders, which is equal to the
consumers  willingness to pay times the probability of successful shipment,
depends on the volume of both types of trade. Marcouiller and Young
(1995) endogenize prices and, like us, argue that there are circumstances in
which a revenue-maximizing State optimally tolerates the informal sector.
In their case an increase in production in the informal sector reduces pro-
duction in the formal sector thus increasing the relative price of the goods
produced there, which, for given elasticity values, increases the value of
production and hence State revenues. Our result has a similar  avor yet
follows from a diﬀerent mechanism: an increase in illegal trade makes legal
trade safer through the multimarket version of safety in numbers. This
increases legal traders  willingness to pay for State enforcement and hence
State revenues under given conditions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 sets out the
model and analyses the illegal trade equilibrium under both self enforce-
ment and Ma a enforcement. Section 2 analyzes State policy to reduce
illegal trade. Section 3 analyzes the linkbetween legal and illegal trade
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1Trade with Private Cops and Robbers
1.1 Elements of the Model
The latter assumption is realistic for the trade in illegal drugs because coca and opium
plants are generally cultivated by many small farmers with no market power. At the
production stage the industry is therefore perfectly competitive.
If we lookat drugs trade as a motivating example, opium seeds and coca leaves actually
need to be processed to yield heroin and cocaine. Processing typically takes place in the
producing country as it considerably reduces volume. Traders are often involved in the
The basic theme of safety in numbers and its sometimes surprising con-
sequences emerge in a model of a single market subject to predation and
the possible protection of a specialized enforcer. We set out the elements
of the model in subsection 1.1. Then in subsection 1.2 we solve the model
for the rational expectations equilibrium success rate at a given volume
of trade, based on the objective interaction of predator and prey and the
clearance of the labor market. The equilibrium quantity at a given wage
rate is analyzed in subsection 1.3. Either probability-taking self enforcers
or monopoly enforcers who internalize safety in numbers at a given wage
rate determine the conditional quantity. The simultaneous goods and la-
bor market equilibrium of the model and its properties are analyzed in
subsection 1.4.
Trade from low cost country (region) 1 to high price country (region) 2
comes at increasing cost. For simplicity we  x buyers  willingness to pay in
country 2 at , we assume that any quantity of the good can be purchased at
price in country 1, and we assume that the good requires no further




















T      , C        R      
() = ( ) ( )
()
() = ( )
() = [ () ]










C w,r,q K r w,K,q ,
C w,K,q Cw,r w,K,q ,q.
tw , qK Cw , K , q/ q ,
.
C
C w,r,q w r
q  C w , K , q w q k
kK   .
tw , qK k w q .
C  q k
processing but not in the cultivation process. The latter is probably due to the fact that
there are economies of scale in processing and trading but not in production. Analysing
the degree of vertical integration in the industry is interesting but it goes beyond the scope
of the current paper.
If both goods and money are subject to predation or if goods can be stolen from buyers
after purchase, the setups are more cumbersome, but nothing essential changes.
trade technology requires labor drawn from a common pool with predation
being the alternative use of labor. Increasing opportunity cost is introduced
to the model by assuming that trade also requires capital, which is in  xed
supply (representing either infrastructure or divisible capital such as ships).
The trade services long run cost function is given by the constant re-
turns function where is concave and homo-
geneous of degree one in the wage rate and the service price of trade
capital The volume of trade is . The capital stockin the trade services
industry is  xed at The short run cost function is given by
formed by using to solve for then substitut-
ing to obtain The unit cost is given by
equal to the marginal cost of a price-taking com-
petitive trading  rm The demand for labor in the trading services in-
dustry is by Shephard s Lemma. For concrete results we frequently
specialize to a Cobb-Douglas technology which implies
where is the cost share of labor. Then where
The unit cost is given by
(1)
The demand for labor is equal to .
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On the approaches to the market, the uncoordinated traders take defensive
actions with speed and concealment, and possibly by hiring a monopolist
specialized enforcer, which we call the Ma a for emphasis, who can increase
their success rate. Ma a and self enforcement cannot coexist in the same
market when a homogeneous product is exchanged.
The interaction of masses of anonymous predators and prey is critical to
our model. On the approaches to the trade zone, we assume that traders
are uncoordinated and spread themselves out evenly hoping to elude cap-
ture. Predators likewise spread themselves evenly around the approaches
to the trade zone attempting to  nd sellers. Any encounter results in loss.
With this matching/antimatching setup, the greater the density of preda-
tors to prey, the lower the probability of the traders  successfully eluding
predation. The trader thus eludes or escapes the predators with a proba-
bility which is a decreasing continuous function of the ratio of predators
to prey, where is the number of
For traders to be willing to pay for Ma a enforcement, the Ma a must oﬀer a higher
success rate than self enforcement when both are available. But when both modes of
enforcement are used, predators will allocate themselves between self- and Ma a-protected
trade so as to equalize the success rates. Self enforcement free rides on the eﬀectiveness
of Ma a enforcement and ends in driving Ma a enforcement from the market. To prevent
free riding and the collapse of its market, the Ma a must force all traders to pay for its
enforcement.Typically, the Ma a threatens to seize the goods of self-enforcing traders.
The discussion casts a new light on the frequently observed compellence associated with
Ma a protection.
The model is applicable to many types of markets where interaction is anonymous and
reputation cannot discipline opportunism. In contrast, in very localized markets, secure
trade with small gains and no formal enforcement can be sustained because reputation
attaches to predators and activates retribution; an implicit commitment not to predate
becomes credible.
Some readers may remember the childhood game of Fish in the Net and note its
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The logistic functional form has been extensively used in the con ict literature. The
rationale in that case is quite diﬀerent: the variables are replaced by the armaments
or campaign expenditures of the two contestants, who interact non-anonymously.
Surveillance technology can frustrate encounters without implying loss recovery. If
instead the frustration arises from Ma a guards on patrol interfering with encounters,
is likely to be a function of the force level of the Ma a relative to the force level of the
predators.
predators (bandits). For concrete results we frequently impose the logistic
form on yielding the success rate:
(2)
where the superscript indicates self-enforcement and is a parameter that
captures the relative eﬃciency of predators.
When the Ma a provides enforcement we assume the same avoidance
technology is used by the traders as with self enforcement, since it is costless.
In addition, however, the Ma a is assumed to be able to recover a fraction
of the loss or, equivalently, to frustrate some encounters between traders
and predators which would otherwise result in property loss. We assume
that concern for reputation disciplines the Ma a to honor its commitment.
The success rate of Ma a enforced exchange is therefore a compound equal
to the probability of avoidance plus one minus the probability of avoidance
times the probability that the Ma a recovers property from a successful
predator. Here we plausibly assume that the outcomes of evasion and
recovery are independently distributed. The success rate for the Ma a
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Riskaversion can be admitted at some cost in added complexity. A treatment would
require modeling the implications of costly riskpooling among predators and its implica-
tions for their coordination in other activities, all of which take us far from the central
focus of the paper.
The  xed point problem has a trivial solution at since Graphing
against shows that if is the only solution, it is stable under the plau-
Capability is purchased by the Ma a incurring a  xed cost For sim-
plicity we assume that the size of the market is such that only a monopolist
might be able to make non-negative pro ts given .
Agents form a subjective probability of successful shipment by
traders entering the market. Their beliefs about determine the expected
payoﬀs to trading and predation under the two alternative enforcement
setups. In equilibrium, the subjective probability must equal the objective
probability and the returns on labor in all types of activity must be equal
while clearing the labor market.
The riskneutral predators are indiﬀerent between predation and trade
services when
(4)
For the case of self enforcement, substituting (4) into the objective prob-
ability function yields a  xed point problem in
(5)
We assume a stable interior solution, and thus
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the logistic cumulative density function:
Labor market clearance relates wage to the quantity traded . The
total supply of labor is allocated between trade services and predation
(6)
Solving for the unique market clearing wage we have where
(7)
Substituting into (5) we have:
(8)
Equation (8) shows that there is safety in numbers: the probability of
successful shipments increases in the volume of trade. More trade is asso-
ciated with higher payoﬀ to trading but also higher trade-oﬀ to predation.
The former eﬀect however dominates to make trade safer in our model.
For monopoly enforcement, we obtain the rational expectations equilib-
rium probability by using , solving for
sible hypothesis that the subjective probability adjusts toward the objective probability
given the beliefs If an interior solution exists and is unique, it must be stable
because in the neighborhood of the solution. In this case the secure equi-
librium is unstable. There could be multiple interior equilibria, depending on the shape
of the cumulative density function With multiple equilibria, unstable interior solutions
are  anked by stable interior solutions.
The other solution has but this is unstable under the adjustment mechanism
of the preceding footnote.
The right hand side of (6) is decreasing in and is unboundedly large at very low
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Aside from the unstable solution there is a unique solution on the unit interval.
The argument follows that for the proof in the case of the general cumulative density
Diﬀerentiate implicitly with respect to Note that
by the equation above, simpli es to Using
this expression in numerator and denominator of the implicit derivative and simplifying
yields the simple expression of the text.
Indeed if predators are available in in nitely elastic supply at a  xed opportunity cost,
the number of predators rises in proportion to to maintain and thus constant.
and solving the quadratic equation for the rational expectations equilibrium
probability:
(9)
Diﬀerentiating (3) implicitly using for we obtain
(10)
As goes to 1, also goes to one and thus while at we
have Note that
Labor market clearance using (9) yields the equilibrium wage rate as
(11)
Then also under monopoly enforcementthere is safety in numbers:
and As before, this arises because
while is increasing in is decreasing in
and
Safety in numbers is quite a general property of trade with predation.
It is an equilibrium property incorporating the rise in predators with
the volume of trade subject to increasing opportunity cost. Increasing
opportunity cost arises here because of diminishing returns to a  xed factor,M
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but can be generated by heterogeneous labor or technological diminishing
returns, all quite plausible.
Our model encompasses predation as extortion as well theft. A part or
all of may be understood to re ect the victim s share from an encounter.
Predator and prey may rationally share as the outcome of a Rubinstein
alternating oﬀers bargaining game, when for example the prey has the
outside option of destroying the goods.
Predator/prey models have been used in a variety of settings, especially
in the context of common resources management such as  sheries. Neher
(1978) applies the predator/prey analogy to street robberies but, unlike
ours, his model assumes safety in numbers rather than deriving it. Sah
(1991) oﬀers a related model in which criminals  probability of being caught
by law enforcers falls as more criminals enter relative to a  xed stockof
law enforcement resources, a kind of safety in numbers for predators. The
payoﬀ per crime is  xed in his model and the expected payoﬀ rises with the
numberof criminals. In our model, the number of predators and the number
of self-enforcing traders are both endogenous, a signi cant generalization
of the environment. In passing we note that safety in numbers is a novel
source of the economies of agglomeration which feature in the new economic
geography literature. (See for example Fujita, Krugman and Venables,
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1.3 The Equilibrium Volume
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Positive marginal cost changes no essential feature.
Alternatively one might assume that the Ma a is sophisticated in understanding that
the number of predators it faces are aﬀected by the volume of trade, using
but this assumes a general equilibrium sophistication in knowing the wage rate as a func-
tion of its volume decision, hence the eﬀect on trade costs via this channel,
. This sophistication about input market eﬀects is usually not assumed to
obtain for monopolies.
The equilibrium volume of trade for a given wage and embedding rational
expectations equilibrium success rates is determined either by the no arbi-
trage condition of self enforcement or the pro t maximizing decision of the
monopolist, given the reduced form market clearing wage function.
For self enforcement, traders expect to breakeven when
Their beliefs about must be consistent with the equilibrium probability of
success. The self enforcement equilibrium quantity for given wage uniquely
satis es
(12)
The Ma a s optimal quantity policy is de ned by maximizing revenue
with respect to volume due to our simplifying assumption of zero marginal
cost. Any level of can be selected by Ma a pricing of enforcement
provided the level of is the equilibrium probability of
success We assume that the Ma a takes the number of predators as given
in calculating safety in numbers and also takes the wage rate as given in
calculating the eﬀect of volume changes on the unit cost of suppliers. The
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Proof:
1.4 The Full Equilibrium
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The sophisticated Ma a solves essentially the same problem, but uses and
in place of and It can be shown that the naive Ma a underestimates the
eﬀect of safety in numbers because, due to the power of increasing opportunity cost through
actually falls with a rise in
If a trade equilibrium exists, it is insecure whenever the
arbitrage margin ( is smaller than a threshold and secure
otherwise.Zero trade is always a stable equilibrium under self-enforcement
and it is the only equilibrium if the arbitrage margin is suﬃciently small.
instead of its true equilibrium value based on The Ma a selects
according to
The  rst order condition for the Ma a is:
(13)
At an interior optimum, . The Ma a will enter the market provided
that where is the revenue-maximizing value of trade.
The full equilibrium of the model is determined by goods and labor market
clearance simultaneously, equations (11) and either (12 ) or (13), embedding
rational expectations equilibrium for the success rate of trading. In the ap-
pendix we report a thorough examination of existence in the Cobb-Douglas
logistic (henceforth CDL) case and we show that:
see Proposition A2 in the Appendix.
A crucial property of the model is that trade can be secure even though
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that a small amount of predation will have small chance of success, hence
 too large  a number of predators is required to be consistent with in-
secure equilibrium. Alternatively equilibrium with positive trade may be
prevented by potential predation, even though there are gains from trade
net of trade costs. Collectively, the collapse of trade or its insecure existence
is a market failure which is due to the individually rational but collectively
irrational act of predation. All workers acting collectively would always
enjoy the higher wages of secure trade if they could commit themselves not
to predate. We emphasize that coordination failure of the standard kind
is responsible for zero trade: there is always someone to trade with
in this model and there is no need to achieve suﬃcient scale to pay for a
shared infrastructure. Indeed, conventional  xed costs are absent from the
model, so conventional scale eﬀects of all kinds are absent. However, the
requirement of the trade technology that goods be acquired at cost
prior to shipping introduces a sunkcost of trade which we show is responsi-
ble for the possible non-existence of positive trade equilibrium. Zero trade
obviously cannot be an equilibrium under Ma a enforcement because of
the  xed cost
The results for both extremes run contrary to the simple but incorrect
intuition that it would always pay to have a little bit of trade with a cor-
respondingly small amount of predation at one limit, and that perfectly
safe trade would always attract some predation. The correct intuition is
supplied by safety in numbers   at low volume trade is very unsafe even
with a little bit of predation while at very high trade volume it is very safe26
26
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2 State Policies Against Illegal Trade
2.1Eliminating the Ma a
Our analysis is only about the  bene t  side of State policies in reducing trade volume
or Ma a revenues; a full analysis must incorporate the cost of the policies. Reducing the
Ma a s capability or eliminating its presence may be very costly compared to raids on
trade. If the trade reduction goal is more important than the Ma a reduction goal, State
attacks on the Ma a become less attractive.
(and hence predation is very unsafe) even with low numbers of predators.
One thrust of State policy against illegal trade attacks trade or its insti-
tutional foundations directly. We show that breaking up the enforcement
monopoly can either raise or lower illegal trade in our model. The State
can also attackby becoming a predator itself, as with drug seizures. State
raids, if eﬀective, will reduce self enforced trade but can increase monopoly
enforced trade. The second thrust of State policy targets the consumers
and producers of illegal substances, including such policies as negative ad-
vertising and crop eradication. Their impact diﬀers somewhat depending
on the market structure of enforcement, but they do reduce trade.
Eliminating the Ma a has an ambiguous eﬀect on the volume of trade in our
model. On the one hand, removing monopoly power should increase trade,
as Schelling (1988) noted. But on the other hand, the monopoly internalizes
safety in numbers and probably has a better enforcement technology.
The ranking of trade volumes is determined by the sign of marginal
revenue of the Ma a at the self enforcement equilibrium volume of trade,
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In the CDL case with and eliminating
the Ma a increases trade volume when demand is inelastic it decreases
trade volume when demand is elastic and the buyers  willingness to pay is
small enough.
The Ma a is assumed here to be unconstrained in its pricing relative to traders switch-
ing to self enforcement. But traders will attempt to switch to self enforcement if the Ma a
oﬀers worse success than does self enforcement. Leaving aside extortionate power, the
limit at which traders will switch is de ned by So the constraint,
if binding, limits the extent to which trade can be reduced by the Ma a.
cost for Ma a and self enforcement. Evaluating at and using
we have:
(14)
The  rst term on the right hand side represents the eﬀect of the Ma a
internalizing the safety in numbers externality and is positive. The second
term captures the eﬀect of the Ma a s superior enforcement technology and
is also positive: keeping the level of exchange constant the success rate is
higher with Ma a enforcement due to its superior technology. The third
term represents the monopoly pricing consideration of the Ma a and is
negative.
A parametric characterization of the ranking can be obtained in the
CDL case Abstract from enforcement power by assuming that the Ma a
does not have a superior enforcement technology. The inverse elasticity
of demand, apart from safety in numbers, is hence
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2.2 Weakening the Ma a
2.3 Raids
Another method of State attackon the Ma a is to reduce its capability
For example, State patrols can force Ma a enforcement patrols to be
more clandestine, or imprisonment can lower the quality and quantity of
enforcers working for the Ma a. In the Appendix we show that such pol-
icy unambiguously reduces trade in the Cobb-Douglas logistic case. More
generally the eﬀects may be ambiguous because while reducing directly
lowers the success rate and hence the marginal revenue of the Ma a, the
indirect eﬀect is to lower the wage which shifts both the trade cost and
the probability of success function.
The State can also attackthe Ma a is by  taxing  Ma a members. We
have in mind actual tax enforcement as well as raising the expected jail
time over the member s life. This policy raises  xed cost and reduces
pro ts. It does not alter volume of trade unless the Ma a is driven from
the market.
Raids on exchange are understood in our model as an increase in State
sponsored predation. If the State hires predators from the common labor
pool at the going wage, as is plausible, then in our model there is no net
eﬀect, regardless of whether or not there is a specialized enforcer. State pre-
dation displaces private predation one-for-one. To see this point, note that
can be interpreted as the sum of State and private predation. However,
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2.4 Upstream and Downstream Policies
of trade falls both in the Ma a and in the self-enforcement case. See the
Appendix for details.
In contrast, if the State brings in predators from outside, this has the
eﬀect of increasing the total labor supply The increase in labor supply
reduces for given which for self enforcement equilibrium (see Figure
1) will lower In contrast, for a monopoly enforcer the fall in can
perversely raise marginal revenue at given , and thus the monopolist per-
versely increases the equilibrium volume of trade . The appendix shows
that the normal response occurs when capability is low and the success rate
is suﬃciently low: In contrast, when capability and the success
rate is high, the Ma a will perversely raise trade in response to raids which
enlarge the labor supply. Essentially this occurs because the trade cost
reducing implication of the wage decrease dominates the security reduc-
ing implication as security at high levels becomes relatively insensitive to
changes in the variables which determine it.
Finally, the State can reduce trade in illegal goods by attacking upstream
and downstream to narrow the gross margin . Examples of these poli-
cies include  say no to drugs  campaigns that lower the buyers  willingness
to pay , and spraying farmers   elds or bribing them to grow other crops,
which raises costs . In the appendix we show that these policies are eﬀec-
tive under either self-enforcement or Ma a enforcement. The eﬀectiveness
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3 A Theory of Benign Neglect
3.1Model Setup
If the markets are fully integrated so that enforcement is a homogeneous product, the
results are qualitatively the same. Diﬀerentiation is somewhat more general and realistic.
The  xed relative price is natural when the good is physically homogeneous. An
endogenous relative price would complicate the model without adding any real insight.
This simplifying assumption is natural if predators are thieves, somewhat less so if
they are extortionists.
dation following various means of attackon trade will oﬀset trade-reducing
policies.
Trade in illegal goods often exists alongside legal trade enforced by the
State. The two kinds of trade are obviously interdependent since agents
can operate (i.e. trade or predate) in both. In this section we show that
the safety in numbers externality spills over across markets, so an exogenous
increase in the volume of illegal (legal) trade makes legal (illegal) trade more
secure. As a consequence, under conditions given, the growth of legal trade
fosters the growth of illegal trade and successful attacks on illegal trade
reduce the legal trade and revenue of the State. Collusion with enforcement
in the illegal market will increase trade and revenue in both markets.
Legal and illegal goods are sold in two markets diﬀerentiated by location
in space, time of day and other features. Predators allocate themselves
between the two markets to equalize their expected payoﬀ. For simplicity
the payoﬀ is expected per capita volume because the goods stolen from
each have a  xed relative price. The predators are perfect substitutes in
the two markets. The traders are also perfect substitutes in the two=  b
23 T      , C        R      
markets, at least via trade and predation being perfect substitutes.
We assume for simplicity that the State maximizes revenues. In prac-
tice the State might care about the welfare of its citizens and thus the
possible externalities generated by their consumption of illegal goods, such
as cocaine and heroin. Even in this case, however, the State must take
into account the eﬀect of its policies on revenues, as these determine the
position of its budget constraint. The State may also give the interests of
legal traders some added political weight. Our treatment below contains
the key elements which would operate with these alternative State objective
functions, yet is simpler.
Legal trade is enforced by the State, illegal trade can be either enforced
by the private specialized enforcer or self enforced. The main qualitative
conclusions apply to both cases, as we demonstrate below, so we stickto the
specialized enforcer (Ma a) case. The probability of successful exchange
with specialized enforcement (in either market) is as before a compound
of avoidance and the ability of the enforcer to recover goods or frustrate
theft when a predator has a close encounter with his prey. The probability
of successful exchange with self enforcement is equal to the probability of
avoidance only. We assume that the avoidance technology is the same in the
two markets, but allow for possible asymmetry of enforcement capability
between the private enforcer (the Ma a) and the State. Variables for illegal
trade are denoted with a *.
As with monopoly in the single market case, when the State charges
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Multimarket Safety in Numbers.
[+( ) +]
=[ + ( ) ]
= + (1 )
1
1+




++ + ( ) = +
=( 1 ) =( 1 )
= + (1 )
1
1 + (1 )
= + (1 )
1
1 + (1 )
ct q   /   . q








B B  q k   q k N N .
w  q / B  q / B .
q/B q /B
 M M
   / w
 M M
   / w
.
Even if the transport workers were specialized as to markets, it would be irrelevant
because the alternative employment is predation which acts on both markets.
Any level of can be selected by the State pricing of
enforcement provided the level of is the equilibrium
probability of success
The probability of success in each market is given by
If the illegal sector is self enforced,
The predators and traders allocate themselves between the two markets
and equalize the wage rate and the return to predation. The labor market
clearance condition is:
(15)
The equal return condition for predation and trade workimplies
(16)
Solving for and from the equal returns condition (16) and
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Solving each quadratic for the probability (eliminating the roots
with unstable equilibrium), we obtain the rational expectations equilibrium
probabilities:
(17)
Now solve the equal returns condition (16) for and Substitute
the preceding expressions for into this solution, substitute for
in (15), then solve for in:
(18)
Note that Note also that which arises
as the lower payoﬀ to predation pushes predators into the productive labor
market and decreases the wage.
Finally, substitute for in (17):
(19)
(20)
Evidently, there is safety in numbers across markets: both and
are positive (as are and . Safety in numbers is a
due to the diminishing returns technology; predators are drawn
from a labor pool at increasing opportunity cost. The property also holds
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Complementarity in demand.
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Imperfect substitution of predators across markets weakens the multi-market aspect
of the safety in numbers externality. This weakens strategic complementarity, but im-
perfect substitution also weakens the cost increasing eﬀect which strengthens strategic
complementarity.
To see this, diﬀerentiate the willingness to pay for enforcement in the State market
with respect to illegal trade volume: Here,
is the enforcement tax. Using the equilibrium condition substitute on
the right hand side for to yield
which is positive for small (surely at where and negative for large
(surely at where
property is more general than the speci cs of the setup because increasing
opportunity cost is quite general.
Safety in numbers implies complementarity in demand provided that
the enforcement technology of the State is not too strong. The intuition
is based on the fact that the probability of a successful shipment in the
legal sector ( is less sensitive to the number of predators and hence total
trade volume as increases. That is, if the State is able to recover most
of the stolen goods, the probability of meeting a predator does not really
matter for successful shipments.
When the Ma a charges per unit for enforcement, the equilibrium volume
is determined by Any level of can be selected
by the Ma a pricing of enforcement provided the
level of is the equilibrium probability of success Similarly any level of
can be selected by the State by pricing of enforcement
We assume that the State (Ma a) takes the volume of illegal (legal)
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We have solved the case in which the State and the Ma a compete in prices. Results,
not reported for reasons of space, are available from the authors upon request.
at trade of size with capability requires setting up some sort of plan,
hiring guards, coordinating information and so forth. Our main conclusions
are robust with respect to a change in the mode of competition.
Because the duopolists play Nash with respect to each other s strategies,
it is logical to assume that they are naive in their calculation of marginal
cost and of safety in numbers. Thus, focusing on the State as the unstarred
player, the objective probability used to assess marginal bene t is
and is taken as given. Then
(21)
Also, the total cost of trade is evaluated using
and the State takes as given. The total revenue is the product of the
willingness-to-pay and the quantity, We assume
for simplicity that there is no variable cost and that revenues exceed the
 xed cost. The pro t- and revenue-maximizing quantity is de ned by
where An analogous condition de nes
the Ma a s revenue-maximizing quantity:
To compute trade volumes we need to de ne the general equilibrium best
response functions. The security terms and
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a) Trade volumes are strategic complements in the
Cobb-Douglas logistic case at when other parameters are such that
(b) As rises, eventually trade volumes are strategic substitutes.
while for the Ma a
(23)
based on using and for in and and on substi-
tuting for in and The system (22)-(23) of
best response functions de nes the Nash equilibrium.
Strategic complementarity obtains if (and similarly for the
Ma a s best response). Strategic complementarity occurs when the mar-
ginal revenue eﬀect of safety in numbers is suﬃciently large. The
conditions for strategic complementarity and complementarity in demand,
while closely related and dependent on the strength of safety in numbers,
have no necessary connection. The condition for strategic complementar-
ity/substitutability is characterized by:
The intuition of the proposition is that at high levels of success, the
success rate is relatively insensitive to changes in its arguments, so the
spillover of safety in numbers is not strong enough to outweigh the spillover
of cost increases, so the quantity strategies become substitutes.
When self enforcement replaces the Ma a in the informal sector, the
structural diﬀerence is that . Behaviorally, the self enforcement
market  selects  for zero revenue rather than maximum revenue, given
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Legal and Illegal Trade.
negatively sloped, but for the Cobb-Douglas logistic case the slope is al-
ways positive, the analog of  strategic complementarity . Thus
State competition with self enforcement shares the qualitative properties
of competition with Ma a enforcement.
Complementarity in demand implies that reductions in illegal trade re-
duce State revenues. For example, the eﬀect on state revenues of reducing
the willingness to pay for illegal goods is given by , where
The bracket term is positive when there is com-
plementarity in demand. Previous results show complementarity obtains
when is small and substitutability obtains when is large. A pure
revenue-maximizing State would never adopt policy to squeeze illegal trade
when complementarity obtains. A State that takes citizens  welfare into
account and believes that consumption of illegal goods is welfare-reducing,
has to balance the bene ts of curtailing illegal trade with the cost deriving
from revenue reduction. A politically responsive state probably weighs its
traders  interests more than the revenue-maximizing state, in which case
the response of to is relevant.
An exogenous increase in the volume of illegal trade has two opposite
eﬀects on the volume of legal trade. On the one hand, legal trade increases
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States  Stance towards Illegal Trade.
A full set of comparative static derivatives with respect to policy varibles is suppressed
here but is available on request.
price received by traders increases), but on the other hand legal trade de-
creases because the wage has increased through the pecuniary externality of
increased activity in the illegal sector. The  rst eﬀect dominates when the
State enforcement technology is weak, whereas the second eﬀect dominates
when the State enforcement technology is strong so that avoidance loses
relevance. Strategic complementarity implies that policies which reduce il-
legal trade also reduce legal trade. The Appendix shows that reducing the
willingness to pay for illegal goods   one of the upstream policies that
successfully reduce illegal trade   leads to a reduction in the volume of
legal trade and of State revenues when the State enforcement technology is
weakand the condition of Proposition 3 obtains.
Upstream and downstream policies do not aﬀect the labor market di-
rectly, so they are simpler. Policies such as drug raids and attacks on the
Ma a s capability, in contrast, have direct labor market impact. Neverthe-
less, the key qualitative insights of this section carry through: under weak
enforcement technology, demand complementarity implies that attacks on
the illegal sector reduce State revenue while strategic complementarity im-
plies that attacks on the illegal sector reduce formal sector trade. Details
are suppressed here to save space.
Complementarities deriving from the externality associated with safety
in numbers might therefore explain why States sometimes appear to tol-
erate illegal trade. Indeed, the stance towards illegal trade varies widely31 T      , C        R      
across States and time. Countries like the US have been long engaged in a
 war  on drugs, while others have changed their stance through the years.
In our model the optimal stance towards illegal trade depends on the eﬀec-
tiveness of the enforcement technology: reducing illegal trade is costly for
 weak  States, bene cial for  strong  States. As the enforcement technol-
ogy improves, the State need not rely on the safety in number externality
to keep legal trade safe.
With strategic complementarityand demand complementarity, the State
should rationally seekto collude with the private enforcer to increase trade
in both markets. State collusion with Ma as is usually taken to mean a
failed State which has eﬀectively been taken over in the interest of the
Ma a; our model oﬀers an alternative interpretation. When repeated in-
teraction is plausible, reputation may sustain collusion between State and
Ma a even in the absence of formal mechanisms.
The argument is consistent with casual empiricism: the informal/illegal
sector is much more tolerated in developing countries where the State en-
forcement technology is weaker. Marcouiller and Young (1995) also provide
a model in which State revenues from enforcing rights in the formal sec-
tor increase as the size of the informal sector increase. Their mechanism,
however, works through prices and does not therefore relate to the stage of
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See US General Accounting Oﬃce (1999) and , 11 September, 1999.
We have developed a model of trade subject to predation which is defended
by enforcement organized in several institutional structures. A key feature
of the equilibrium interaction of predators and traders is safety in numbers:
the success rate rises with the volume of trade. We have shown that safety
in numbers has important implications for the existence of trade in the
absence of legal enforcement, for the success of State policies against illegal
trade and for understanding the State s stance versus illegal trade.
Understanding the eﬀect of State policies on the institutions which sup-
port trade is crucial for assessing the eﬀectiveness of such policies. Drugs
trade provides an illuminating example: the breakup of the Colombian drug
trade cartels, possibly the most tangible outcome of the U.S. government s
 war on drugs , was actually followed by a in volume as new, much
smaller scale traders successfully organized the trade.
Successful attacks on trade may not be in a State s best interest. Safety
in numbers spills across markets and acts toward complementarity in the
demand for enforcement across markets and toward strategic complemen-
tarity in enforcement. Trade volume and revenue thus tend to be positively
associated across formal and informal markets at low levels of development.
But as States  enforcement capability improves, eventually enforcement de-
mands become substitutes and strategic substitutability obtains, so high
capability States may have shrinking illegal trade and be intolerant to it.
We thinkthese models oﬀer a rich but fairly simple and  exible plat-) bc
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form for the future analysis of enforcement as protection of exchange from
predation. For instance, while the trade in the model can readily be interna-
tional, we have suppressed conventional terms of trade eﬀects (endogenous
and and allow for at most one active State. Relaxing one or both of
these may provide more insights into trade-destroying policies of develop-
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The zero arbitrage condition for self enforcement yields the equilibrium volume as
a function of the wage:
where The  rst order condition for monopoly enforcement yields its volume
oﬀer as
where and
The second order condition holds globally for suﬃciently large . For
Diﬀerentiating the marginal revenue function
This is negative for suﬃciently large increasing even after accounting for the
decrease in . Increases in can be made consistent with the suﬃcient condition
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future purposes we note that
Since our focus is on insecure trade, the following lemma states the neces-
sary and suﬃcient condition to rule out secure trade regardless of the mode of
enforcement.
Trade equilibrium, if it exists, is insecure in the CDL case when
Proof: Trade is secure in the self enforcement case when the equilibrium wage
so that instead of obeying (8), Similarly for the monopoly enforce-
ment case, trade is secure when and Moreover, with no predation,
all labor is employed in trade, resulting in a  xed volume of The
self enforcement demand for secure trade becomes
and is solved for the equilibrium wage. The monopoly s secure
trade volume function becomes with the equilibrium
wage solved from
Then it follows that self enforced trade is secure if and only if
while Ma a enforced trade is secure if and only if
The lemma then follows from the fact that
Intuitively, when the arbitrage margin is very high relativeto the number
of agents in the economy , wages are high and there is no ratio of predators
relative to traders such that predation pays. Otherwise, some workers enter
predation and trade is insecure.
As argued above, however, the requirement that goods be acquired at cost
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trade in equilibrium. To emphasize this point we state:
In the CDL case under the condition of Lemma A1, if
then (a) insecure self enforcement equilibrium trade exists, (b) if  xed
cost is suﬃciently small and is suﬃciently large, then insecure monopoly
trade equilibrium exists.
Proof: Insecure equilibria are given by the intersection of and with
for . is invariant to under while
Under the condition of Lemma 1, both and
intersect in the range Condition (b) is required to assure that the
monopoly is pro table and that the second order condition holds.
Returning to the general case where and we have
(a) Zero trade is always a stable equilibrium under self-
enforcement. It is the only equilibrium under the condition of Lemma A1 if
and the arbitrage margin is suﬃciently so small that and do not intersect at
all in the relevant range. (b) For suﬃciently small, and the condition
of Lemma A1, stable insecure self enforced equilibrium exists and monopoly trade
equilibrium exists for suﬃciently small and suﬃciently large.
Proof:
The analysis is greatly facilitated with Figure 1 graphing the labor market
clearance condition and the relevant goods market equilibrium condition in
the space. The functions are given by (24 )-(25). has horizontal
intercept at by the arbitrage condition. For
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due to the  rst order condition, and for
is ordinarily concave in and Note that with the capable
monopoly, the equilibrium wage function shifts: where we
extend the notation in an obvious way. Note that .
Proof of (a). Under the standard disequilibrium hypothesis that the adjusts
toward and adjusts toward autarky is a stable equilibrium. By de nition of
and they need not cross, so autarky may be the only equilibrium.
With a single crossing there is an unstable interior equilibrium. Proof of (b):
, while for Then under condition (b)
the two functions and intersect at low while under the condition of
Lemma 2 they must also intersect at a higher . The intersection where cuts
from above is stable.
Proposition A2(a) reveals that zero trade may well emerge as the only equilib-
rium under self enforcement. Zero trade obviously cannot be an equilibrium under
Ma a enforcement because of the  xed cost Taken together with Proposition 1,
the possibility that the mere threat of predation may prohibit trade is founded on
the necessity of paying something for goods which subsequently are at riskof pre-
dation. Zero trade is empirically relevant, as illegal trade is often absent even when
legal trade shows its feasibility with security, grey markets being found mainly in
high margin and high value/weight goods such as alcohol and cigarettes. Proposi-
tion A2 (b) reveals that a suﬃciently large gross margin factor is instrumental
in overcoming the threat of predation. A large elasticity of trade cost with respect
is convex in initially and concave for large enough (based on analyzing
However, is concave in the relevant region only if in the
relevant region, implying for the rightward vertical intercept that
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5.2 State Policies Against Illegal Trade (section 2)
Lowering is consistent with the condition of Lemma 2.
Eliminating the Ma a
Proof of proposition 2
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to volume can, however, prevent trade from arising even for large Only in
the limit can insecure trade be guaranteed, by Proposition A1. While the
proofs are for the CDL case only, their implications hold for a wide class of cost
and density functions . Henceforth we maintain the CDL case for sharp results.
For comparative static analysis it is convenient to de ne the general equilibrium
version of the Ma a s  rst order condition:
.
. The  rst part of the proposition follows from the
implications of To show the second part consider that
the value of at which is If then
in equilibrium. This requires
Then for suﬃciently small acting to depress wages, the condition is met.
Diﬀerentiating the general equilibrium version of the  rst order condition (26),
signed by The eﬀect of on is ambiguous in the gen-
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and we shall prove Recall that
Diﬀerentiating with respect to
It can be shown that , hence we have and thus
Proof: Diﬀerentiate the de nition of to form
which has the sign of
Diﬀerentiate (implicitly) the de nition of (9) to form
Now consider Diﬀerentiating its de nition ( 11) we have
Then substituting and permuting the order of and we have
As argued in the text these are eﬀective only if the State can increase or
(i) Self-enforcement Equilibrium.
At an interior stable self enforcement equilibrium, the comparative static deriv-
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respect to and , then noting the change in and An increase in shifts
to the left while is unchanged, so the trade volume at the stable in-
terior equilibrium therefore falls. An increase in pushes the function to
the right while shifting the function down. The net eﬀect on trade volume
is ambiguous on this reasoning but it can be shown that in the Cobb-
Douglas logistic case. Substituting the equilibrium wage function into the market
clearing equation yields where
The stability condition is so is signed by
for
(ii) Ma a Equilibrium.
Using the  rst order condition we get
In obtaining these expressions we use very similar steps to those used to obtain
Thus
and by the same steps as above
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Upstream and Downstream Policies
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Using the  rst order condition we can rewrite this
as The elasticity is evaluated as
follows. and
hence
At Since if then This
condition is consistent with and requires certain other parameter values
to obtain. Thus if and For large values of
, the bracket term decreases, as does safety in numbers, and hence
(i) Self-enforcement Equilibrium.
Reductions in and/or increases in leave the function unchanged while
shifting the function down to the right. At the stable interior equilibrium the
volume of trade falls. Moreover a large fall in the gains from trade can destroy the
interior equilibrium and lead to autarky (i.e. the function lies everywhere
below
(ii) Ma a Equilibrium.
Reductions in and/or increases in reduce the arbitrage margin and the op-
timal Ma a pricing of enforcement accommodates this with a lower trade volume.
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5.3 A Theory of Benign Neglect (section 3).
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Proof of Proposition 3.
Remark 1
Upstream and Downstream Policy
is monotonic in for given That means there is only
one sign switch from complementarity to substitutability.Monotonicity follows
from diﬀerentiating (27) with respect to to yield:
It was
shown for the single market case that the proof is the same for
the multimarket case and hence is increasing in
44
Strategic complementarity obtains when Thus:
has the sign of the bracket term. The  rst order condition is used to move
from the  rst line to the second. Here, is given by (27). At the
bracket term is equal to Strategic complementarity obtains when
This can be consistent with which is required for an interior equilibrium.
This proves Proposition 4(a). As rises, and thus rises, converges
to which itself converges toward 1, hence the bracket term eventually must
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The  rst order conditon implies which yields
For low the right hand side is positive while for high the left hand side becomes
negative ( is decreasing to zero in
45
Consider policy which shifts or in the Ma a-protected market:
where by the usual stability argument Strategic
complementarity implies that a State which seeks to reduce the Ma a s trade or
the Ma a s revenue can do so only by paying an additional price in reducing its own
sales. Intuitively, the de ection of predators onto the State s market reduces trade
volume and willingness-to-pay for enforcement. The revenue eﬀect of these policies
is given by where . The square
bracket term is positive for when demand for enforcement is complementary in the
two markets, for low values of Enforcement in the two markets are substitutes
for large values of as security becomes insensitive to wages and the trade cost
increasing aspect of wages is dominant. Then for low the State loses revenue
from negative advertising (and similarly from cost increasing) while for high

































  Q(w)= [(bw-qc)/ qwk]
a/1-a 
   

























Figure 1. Self-Enforcement Equilibrium. 
U 
S 